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This thesis examines the relationship between a state’s level of international cooperation and its 
ability to effectively respond to nuclear and radiological disasters.  It includes an analysis of two 
such disasters, the 1986 reactor meltdown in Chernobyl, Ukraine, and the 2011 reactor meltdown 
in Fukushima, Japan.  These two incidents serve as the case studies for this research, and provide 
evidence to suggest the relationship between international cooperation and effective responses.  
This thesis reviews the nuclear and radiological technologies and materials that pose the greatest 
risk to human populations, examines the potential consequences of such disasters, and evaluates 
the level of preparedness of states and relevant international organizations to respond to and 
mitigate the effects of such disasters.  This research identifies gaps in the capacity of state and 
international responses to disasters, most notably, the lack of effective technologies and 
procedures for decontaminating non-industrial sites.  This research includes an analysis of the 
international institutions and frameworks best suited for developing and executing effective 
responses to nuclear and radiological disasters, and suggest specific measures that should be 





From the creation of the first nuclear reactors to the development of advanced thermo-
nuclear weapons systems, scientists and policy makers have continually developed safeguards, 
security procedures, and non-proliferation strategies to reduce the risk of nuclear and 
radiological accidents and attacks throughout the world.  While the security and non-
proliferation policies that have been developed over the last generation have done much to 
ensure the low probability of such events, policy-makers must acknowledge that accidents and 
attacks have and will continue to occur, given an indefinite timeline. 
Why is this important? 
It is critically important to ensure that international procedures are established to mitigate 
the consequences of such events.  My research will underscore this importance by highlighting 
the environmental, economic, political, social, and cultural harms that come with such disasters, 
and by demonstrating how the international community can serve to mitigate these harms.   
Existing academic literature evaluating nuclear and radiological disasters has illustrated 
that the consequences of such disasters are international in nature, but that international 
coordination for mitigating these consequences exists in a relatively limited capacity.  Some 
scholars believe that international cooperation will be essential in managing the consequences of 
future nuclear and radiological disasters – incidents which these scholars also believe to be 
inevitable.  However, there has yet to be empirical research into whether or not there is evidence 
to suggest that international cooperation contributes to nuclear and radiological consequence 
management in any positive manner.  In fact, there are some who might argue that international 
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cooperation might hinder state responses to consequence management because of the 
bureaucratic and decentralized nature of many international and intergovernmental organizations. 
This thesis seeks to determine whether or not there is a relationship between a state’s 
level of international cooperation and its ability to effectively respond to nuclear and radiological 
disasters.  I argue that such increases in international cooperation are related to increases in the 
ability of states to effectively respond to such disasters.  In this context, this thesis defines 
concepts for what is meant by international cooperation and the effectiveness of responses.  
These concepts are used as the independent and dependent variables, respectively, in this 
research analysis.  The respective components of these variables are analyzed so that it can be 
determined whether or not any patterns exist between them.  I also argue that there are little, or 
even no, international guidelines or strategies in place to effectively address nuclear or 
radiological disasters with respect to radioactive decontamination and a state’s long-term 
recovery. 
As a research tool, this thesis includes a comparative analysis of two states and their 
respective management of nuclear and radiological disasters within their borders.  The 
methodology utilizes historical archiving, expert interviews, presentations, and the comparative 
analysis of the information and variables related to the two case studies.  The two case studies 
selected include the 1986 reactor meltdown in Chernobyl, Ukraine (USSR) and the 2011 
multiple reactor meltdown in Fukushima, Japan.  These two case studies were selected because 
they are considered by nuclear industry experts to be the most serious nuclear and radiological 
disasters in history, being the only two nuclear incidents classified as “major disasters” on the 
International Nuclear Event Scale.  Given that these two incidents occurred decades apart, this 
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thesis also addresses the potential impact of technological advances on the comparative 
effectiveness of these responses. 
My research will also refute two potential realist arguments: First, that nuclear 
consequence management is best handled at the state level; and second, that international 
responses would be hindered by state concerns for sovereignty.  I argue that liberal theories 
support potential strategies for the development of nuclear consequence management at the 
international level.  This thesis concludes with a prescriptive section which makes 
recommendations for nuclear and radiological consequence management strategies based upon 
the findings of the research. 
In order to present this research in an organized manner, I have arranged this thesis by a 
sequence of sub-topics and research questions that provide the necessary background 
information and context for understanding nuclear and radiological consequence management.  
The sub-topics and research questions are arranged as follows: 
· Literature Review 
· The Essentials of Nuclear Technology 
· What are nuclear and radiological disasters? 
· What is the difference between a nuclear disaster and a radiological disaster? 
· What potential nuclear and radiological disasters are most likely to threaten 
human populations? 
· What are the consequences of nuclear and radiological disasters? 
· Which states are prepared to deal with such disasters, and do these states 
correspond to the populations most at risk? 
· How have states dealt with nuclear and radiological disasters in the past? 
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· Case Study of the Chernobyl Reactor Meltdown 
· Case Study of the Fukushima Reactor Meltdown 
· Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 
· Are nuclear and radiological disasters international in nature? 
· What, if any, international response mechanisms exist to mitigate the effects of 
nuclear and radiological disasters? 
· Are nuclear and radiological disasters better addressed at the international level? 
· What framework might be used to establish or build upon international 
responses to nuclear and radiological disasters? 






The European Nuclear Society issued its twelfth report, Chernobyl: The Accident, 
Scenario, and Global Impact, in the spring of 2006.  The report summarizes the events leading 
up to the 1986 reactor meltdown in Chernobyl, Ukraine, and reviews some of the environmental, 
health, economic, political, social, and cultural consequences that resulted.  The summary 
includes information regarding what geographic areas experienced radioactive contamination, 
and to what extent.  The immediate and estimated long-term human casualties are listed, as well 
as an estimated number of persons who were rendered disabled by the accident.  The report 
includes the ongoing costs of care and compensation for those affected by the accident, 
radioactive contamination, and the resulting mandatory evacuation.  There is a review of the 
political consequences of Chernobyl, including the development of new international protocols 
for providing expertise to prevent such incidents in the future.  The report includes a brief 
discussion of the social and cultural impact resulting from the permanent, mandatory evacuation 
of more than 330,000 people from their homes in the areas surrounding the Chernobyl site.  The 
report notes the chief causes of the incident, including: an early-generation/unsafe reactor design, 
the operators’ lack of theoretical training and knowledge, and a political culture of strict 
confidentiality.
1
  The report draws additional data and analysis from The Chernobyl Forum’s 
publication: Chernobyl’s Legacy:  Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and 
Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
2
 
In Kevin Zeese’s 2013 analysis for Truthout News entitled, Fukushima: A Global Threat 
That Requires a Global Response, the author highlights several serious concerns of the 
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Fukushima disaster that continue to be neglected.  The three main problems discussed in his 
analysis include: First, that the actual status of three of Fukushima’s reactor cores is uncertain; 
second, that radioactive water leaks into the ocean from the Fukushima plant every day; and 
third, that 11,000 spent nuclear fuel rods being stored at the Fukushima site still need to be 
relocated to a safe, uncontaminated facility.  The analysis determines that the three reactor cores 
reached temperatures so extreme that they were converted into “corium lavas,” and may have 
burned their way through the basements of buildings 1, 2, and 3 of the Fukushima power plant.  
They are believed to be somewhere in the lower levels of the containment structure, or earth 
beneath the plant.  Other breaches in the plant’s containment structure is what continues to allow 
nearly 80,000 gallons of radioactively contaminated water to leak into the ocean on a daily basis.  
While this contamination is considered by many to be the worst contamination of the oceans in 
human history, workers must continue to pump water into the remaining reactor cores to prevent 
additional meltdowns and the potentially explosive consequences posed by critical mass.  If 
enough nuclear cores were to melt in close proximity to one another, they would have the 
potential to achieve critical mass, resulting in a chain-reaction explosion.  If such a reaction were 
to take place with the 11,000 spent fuel rods on-site, it would generate a disaster unrivaled by 
any other in human history.
3
 
In a 2006 report from the Environmental Health Journal entitled, Exposure from the 
Chernobyl Accident had Adverse Effects, the authors evaluate the environmental and health 
effects of long term exposure to radioactive materials released in the Chernobyl disaster.  Their 
research examined the association between residential soil density of 137 Cesium (137Cs) and 
the “blood health” (hemoglobin concentration, and erythrocyte, platelet, and leukocyte counts) in 
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1,251 children from 1993 to 1998.  The researchers gathered their data from 38 residential areas 
affected by contamination from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.  These areas were selected for 
research because of the elevated levels of 137Cs in their residential soil.  The data collected in 
this report shows a statistically significant reduction in red and white blood cell counts, platelet 
counts, and hemoglobin with increasing residential 137Cs soil contamination.  These findings 
suggest that persistent adverse hematological (blood-health) effects are associated with 
residential 137Cs exposure.  These blood-health markers are often related to the development of 
certain cancers and the body’s ability to fight off disease.
4
 
In a 2006 publication for Environmental Health Perspective, authors Baverstock and 
Williams examine the health consequences and meager international response in the aftermath of 
the Chernobyl accident.  Their publication, The Chernobyl Accident 20 Years On: An Assessment 
of the Health Consequences and the International Response, sheds troubling light on the global 
preparedness, or lack thereof, for nuclear and radiological disasters.  The authors evaluate 
Chernobyl’s impact on health, including: thyroid carcinoma, acute radiation sickness, 
psychological consequences, genetic consequences, birth defects, and leukemia.  The authors 
note that there has been a significant lack of cooperation among researchers who seek to better 
understand these adverse health effects.  This is believed to be due to the lack of an international 
framework for coordinating multiple state and intergovernmental health research teams.  The 
authors note that these teams seem to compete for exclusive access and control of research rather 
than cooperate for solutions.  The publication provides a scathing assessment of international 
responses to the Chernobyl crisis, noting that while the incident clearly had international 
consequences, its handling was still considered an internal, single-state matter.  The international 
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responses evaluated in this publication are limited to international research into the health effects 
of Chernobyl, noting that international response mechanisms for decontamination and 
repatriation were virtually nonexistent.
5
 
Yoichi Funabashi and Kay Kitazawa’s March 1
st
, 2012, article for the Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists, Fukushima in Review: A Complex Disaster, a Disastrous Response, critiques the 
shortcomings of responses to the March 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Station.  The article highlights that the immediate responses to the disaster were hindered 
by miscommunication between the Japanese government and the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO).  The authors note that it was unclear as to whether the government or the 
utility company was responsible for managing the crisis.  The authors review the sequence of 
events which ultimately led the breaches in the reactors’ containment structures.  The article 
notes that, while the first step in this sequence was a natural disaster (a tsunami), the nuclear 
disaster was the result of design flaws within the plant and human error in terms of response.  
The article claims that the Japanese government and TEPCO overstated the plants level of safety 
while simultaneously ignoring advancements in industry technology that could have helped avert 
the crisis altogether.  The authors point to an inherent conflict of interests wherein the nuclear 
regulatory agency in Japan is responsible for policing, as well as promoting nuclear technology.  
The authors further examine gaps in the government and nuclear industry’s capacity to manage 
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Lexi Krock and Rebecca Deusser’s 2013 review of radiological threats for PBS’s Nova 
Science Programming, Dirty Bomb: Chronology of Events, highlights the real and growing 
dangers posed to states by Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs).  The chronology of events 
includes the following: 
· The 1987 discovery of a cesium container in an abandoned cancer treatment facility by a 
villager in Goiaina, Brazil; 
· The 1995 diffusing of a dirty-bomb planted next to the Kremlin by Chechen rebels; 
· The 1998 successful theft of nineteen tubes of cesium from Moses Cone Memorial Hospital in 
Greensboro, North Carolina; 
· The 1998 defusing of a dirty-bomb planted by Chechen rebels in Argun, Chechnya; 
· The attempted theft of radioactive material by Chechen rebels from the Radon Special Combine 
Chemical Factory in Grozny, Chechnya; 
· The 2001 radiological exposure of a man collecting scrap metal from a nuclear powered 
lighthouse in Kandalaksha, Russia; 
· The 2001 radiological exposure of three men who camped near buried Soviet-era radio-thermal 
generators in Lja, Georgia; 
· The 2002 capture of dirty-bomb designer Jose Padilla in Chicago, Illinois; 
· The 2002 acknowledgement by Russia’s nuclear regulatory agency that they are missing 
several grams of weapons grade uranium; and 
· The 2003 discovery of evidence (including diagrams and materials) that suggest that an Al 




The authors highlight how negligence, ignorance, and human error dramatically increase 
the threat of radiological exposure, whether accidental or intentional.  In many of these cases, the 
only thing that prevented terrorists from successfully using these materials was that they handled 
them improperly and died – leading authorities to investigate and trace their steps.  The authors 
note that the most troubling of these cases includes those in which radiological material has been 
stolen or diverted, and has yet to be recovered.  These incidents are particularly disturbing, not 
only because the materials involved are inherently dangerous, but because they are clearly in the 
hands of individuals who have had some training as to their proper handling.  This indicates a 




In Warren Stern’s 2014 published presentation for Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism, the author highlights the U.S. Government’s “Nuclear 
Defense Spectrum” in terms of preparing for radiological attacks.  The author looks at nuclear 
and radiological terrorism through three lenses: first, nuclear and radiological threats, second, 
international regimes for nuclear and radiological security, and third, regimes for prevention.  In 
terms of analyzing threats, Mr. Stern discusses the difference between a nuclear device and a 
radiological device.  He continues by discussing the challenges and consequences associated 
with these threats.  The presentation then covers the sources of the materials related to these 
threats and the spectrum of activities that surround them.  In discussing international security 
regimes, the author compares the evolution of nuclear safeguards designed to prevent states from 
diverting nuclear material for military use, and security regimes that tend to focus on protecting 
material from terrorist organizations.  The presentation illustrates the relationship between 
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safeguards and security.  The author then reviews three international conventions addressing 
security: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Code of Conduct on the 
Safety and Security of Radiation Sources, and the Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism.  In terms of preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism, Stern highlights several 
United States and international programs such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative – which 
covers both foreign and domestic security elements.  The presentation examines the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Fund, an initiative to assist states in keeping their nuclear and radiological 
materials secured.  The presentation ends with an overview of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security’s nuclear detection objectives and the immerging technologies for nuclear detection.
8
 
Elizabeth Eraker’s 2003 publication for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Cleanup After a Radiological Attack: U.S. Prepares Guidance, examines some of the 
steps the United States has taken to prepare for radiological disasters.  The author begins by 
discussing the threats and consequences of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) and the 
scenarios that are most likely to unfold in an RDD attack.  Eraker then goes on to discuss the 
existing clean-up standards for radiological disasters, but notes that these standards have been 
designed to address contamination concerns for industrial sites, not for attacks in populated 
urban environments.  The paper notes that special standards have yet to be established for 
cleaning up after a radiological attack in an urban setting, but that such standards must be 
developed as soon as possible.  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its 
subsidiary, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have conducted multiple 
response coordination scenarios through a program called TOPOFF.  While these emergency 
response scenarios have helped to improve response coordination between local, state, and 
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federal emergency management agencies, there is still a void in developing strategies for long-
term clean up, decontamination, and repatriation.  FEMA has adopted what it refers to as an 
“Optimization Strategy” for dealing with radiological disasters.  This strategy subscribes to the 
idea that all radiological disasters will present their own unique variables that will require unique 
strategies for an effective response, and so no “blanket approach” strategy should be adopted.
9
  
Even if this is the case, Eraker argues that technology must be developed in order to close the 
gaps that currently exist for long-term decontamination.
10
  
Jamie Yassif’s 2003 article for The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, 
How Well Did TOPOFF 2 Prepare Us For Mitigating the Effects of a Dirty Bomb Attack?, 
highlights some of the operational and technical gaps in response strategies for radiological 
disasters.  The article gives an account of FEMA’s five-day emergency response exercise in 
which emergency management agencies responded to the simulated detonation of a dirty-bomb 
in Seattle, Washington.  The author notes that the exercise provided useful information for 
agencies, such as managing radio communications, chain of command, and even ensuring that 
agencies understood one another’s “industry speak” (e.g. acronyms).  Some criticisms of the 
exercise were that emergency personnel knew weeks in advance that the simulation would be 
taking place, and thus were able to prepare for it ahead of time.  A real attack would have been a 
total surprise, and resources likely would not have been mobilized.  Furthermore, all of the 
decision-making for this specific scenario, including White House directives, was predetermined 
and outlined in a “playbook” for the exercise.  This “scripted” response was criticized because it 
is often difficult for leaders to make and communicate decisions under pressure, an important 
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element that did not exist in this exercise.  The author did note that TOPOFF 2 further revealed 
the inability of emergency management agencies to initiate long-term decontamination 
procedures.  Yassif argues that there is a significant gap in the technological capabilities for 
decontamination.   He also states that any such technology will need to be integrated into a 
comprehensive decontamination plan with guidelines for which decontamination technologies 
and methods will be used in which situations, which tasks will be given priority, and who will 
supervise and execute these operations.
11
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s 2015 report for Nuclear Safety & Security 
outlines the organization’s resources for its International Nuclear Security Advisory Service, 
International Physical Protection Advisory Service, Security Systems for Accountancy and 
Control (SSAC) Advisory Service, and Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan.  The 
International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) is designed to help States identify 
their broader nuclear security requirements and the measures needed to meet them.  The service 
seeks to connect Member States with any necessary bilateral agreements in order to meet their 
nuclear security needs.  The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) is a 
service where States can request for assistance in evaluating existing physical protection 
arrangements within their borders.  The service provides the Member State with confidential 
detailed reviews of the legal and regulatory basis for the physical protection of nuclear activities 
within their borders, and of compliance with obligations contained in the CPPNM.  The IAEA’s 
SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) is a service Member States can request which provides 
recommendations and suggestions for improvements to their systems for accountancy and 
control (SSACs) of nuclear material.  The Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) is a 
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service that works with Member States to organize a plan that meets their specific nuclear 
security needs.  Through these IAEA subsidiaries, Member States are offered assistance with 
planning, training, detection equipment, and expert publications for their nuclear security needs.  
The IAEA aims to use these programs to achieve the following goals: 
· 1. To assist States, upon request, in their efforts to establish effective and sustainable national 
nuclear security regimes; 
· 2. To serve as the focal point for strengthening international cooperation, and for coordination 
of nuclear security assistance given through regional and bilateral programs and other 
international initiatives; 
· 3. To enhance global nuclear security efforts by completing international guidance in the 
Nuclear Security Series and, upon request, supporting its implementation by States; 
· 4. To encourage and assist States to adhere to relevant international instruments and support 
States, upon request, in their efforts to adopt implementing national legislation; and 
· 5. To build on the progress made during the implementation of the first three Nuclear Security 
Plans to help States sustain and further improve their national nuclear security regimes. 
The 2014-2017 Nuclear Security Plan covers seven program elements, including: 
· 1. Information Collation and Assessment; 
· 2. External Coordination; 
· 3. Supporting the Nuclear Security Framework Globally; 
· 4. Coordinated Research Projects; 
· 5. Assessment through Self-assessment and/or through Peer Review Missions; 
· 6. Human Resources Development; and  
· 7. Risk Reduction and Security Improvement. 
19 
 
The IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan, four specialized sub-organizations, goals, and 
elements offer strategies for preventing the theft of nuclear and radiological material, but provide 
no expertise, technology, or advice on how to respond in the event that these technologies are 
taken and then used against civilian populations.
12
 
While these publications serve as a useful snapshot of nuclear and radiological 
consequence management, none of this literature evaluates whether international cooperation 
contributes to effective consequence management in a significant way.  Furthermore, current 
research fails to address one of the most important issues in managing nuclear and radiological 
disasters: the decontamination of non-industrial sites, and returning commercial and residential 
environments to a condition wherein people are able to return. 
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The Essentials of Nuclear Technology 
In order to properly unpack the issues related to nuclear and radiological disasters, 
it is helpful to review some of the basics of nuclear technology.  Nuclear technology is 
any technology that harnesses the power generated by the behavior or reactions of the 
atoms of nuclear elements.  Atoms are the smallest units of matter that make up a 
chemical element, and there are thirty-eight chemical elements that have radioactive 





  Some of the most commonly used radioactive elements 
include the following: 
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· Americium-241 is used in household smoke detectors; 
· Californium-252 is used to detect hidden explosives; 
· Carbon-14 is used as a tracer in medical research and for dating artifacts; 
· Cesium-137 is used to irradiate cancerous tumors; 
· Iridium-192 is also used in cancer treatments; 
· Sodium-24 is used to detect leaks in industrial pipelines; 
· Sulfur-35 is used for measuring in the paper and plastics industries; 
· Tritium is used to illuminate exit signs and the dials on many wristwatches; and 
· Uranium-235 is used in nuclear fission power reactors. 
These elements are considered radioactive because of the subatomic particles and 
energy waves that they emit from their nuclei.  There are four types of radioactive 
subatomic particles and energy waves, including Alpha particles, Beta particles, Neutron 









particles, and Gamma Rays.  Radioactive elements emit these particles and/or waves due 
to the composition of their nuclei, or positively charged central cores which consist of 
protons and neutrons – the subatomic particles that contain nearly all of an atom’s mass.  
Radioactive nuclei are arranged in a way that is unbalanced at the subatomic level, 
meaning that the mass of the nucleus is somewhat uneven.  In an attempt to balance its 
subatomic mass, a radioactive nucleus vibrates at a frequency designed to convert its off-
balance mass into energy.  This energy conversion is emitted in the form of radiation.  
This radioactive energy can be harnessed to benefit humans through uses such as 
generating electricity or treating illnesses.  However, the energy emitted by radioactive 
nuclei can also cause significant harm to human populations if used carelessly or 
maliciously.  In this context, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism states: 
“Radioactive material” means nuclear material and other radioactive substances 
which contain nuclides which undergo spontaneous disintegration (a process 
accompanied by emission of one or more types of ionizing radiation, such as 
alpha-, beta-, neutron particles and gamma rays) and which may, owing to their 
radiological or fissile properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial 
damage to property or to the environment.
16
 
Within the nuclear industry, this radioactive material is referred to as Special Nuclear Material 
(SNM).  Any material with this classification is subject to special handling, permits, and the 
oversight of nuclear regulators.  Individual human exposure to radiation emitted by these 
materials is measured by REM (roentgen equivalent in man) and/or RAD (absorbed radiation 
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dose).  According to the International Commission on Radiological Protection, one rem carries 
with it a 0.055% chance of eventually developing cancer.
17
  The health effects associated with 
RAD measurements are as follows: 
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· 25 rad is the lowest dose to cause changes in “blood health.” 
· 200 rad is the local dose for onset of erythema in humans. 
· 400 rad is a high enough does for acute radiation syndrome in humans. 
· 1 krad is the standard radiation tolerance of ordinary microchips. 
· 4 to 8 krad is a dose commonly used for locally applied radiotherapy. 
· 10 krad is a fatal dose in humans. 
· 1 mrad is the maximum tolerance of special, radiation-hardened microchips. 
While this thesis focuses primarily on the misuse of nuclear technology, it is important to 
understand that the main civilian use of nuclear technology is the generation of electricity by 
nuclear power plants.  It is the electric utility industry that is at the heart of developments in the 
enrichment of materials such as uranium, as well as advancements in the technology for modern 
nuclear reactors. 
Enrichment and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
 The process for creating nuclear fuel begins with the mining of natural uranium ore from 
the earth.  After being mined from the earth, the uranium is milled into a powder-like, sandy 
consistency.  Most of this raw, unprocessed ore is Uranium 235 (U235), which is not useful as 
nuclear fuel for most reactor designs.  Less than 1% of this ore is Uranium 238, the isotope of 
uranium that is essential for nuclear reactor fuel.  Workers have to separate the U238 from the 
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U235.  They begin this process through sulfate roasting, hydrolysis, and firing.  By chemically 
treating and baking the uranium through this gasification process, the milled uranium is 
converted into Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6).  This gas is then put through an enrichment 
process.  Because U235 is lighter than U238, spinning the gas rapidly inside a series of 
centrifuges pulls the U238 to the edge and leaves more U235 in the middle.  Once these isotopes 
have been separated so that the level of U238 enrichment has reached 3-5%, it is ready to be 








The UF6 is fed through a process of hydrolysis, acidification, sulfate roasting, and dry 
processing.  The resulting UO2 compound will allow the enriched uranium to be intermittently 
added in a ceramic production mechanical assembly, generating ceramic-like fuel pellets.  These 
pellets will act as the energy source inside nuclear reactors until they lose most of their energy.  
Once used, U238 pellets have been converted into the nuclear byproduct Plutonium Dioxide 
(PuO2).  Most of these pellets are put into spent-fuel storage, often in cooling pools.  Once the 
spent-fuel has been conditioned and cooled, it is stored in an on-site or geological repository.  
There are a few power plants that reprocess their PuO2 to be reused in their reactors before 
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In a nuclear-fueled power plant – much like plants that burn coal, oil, and natural gas – 
electricity is produced by generating heat to convert water into steam. This steam produces 
pressure which then turns turbines which produce electricity. The difference is that there is no 
combustion of fuel in nuclear power plants. Instead, they use the aforementioned ceramic 
uranium fuel pellets packed into long vertical tubes that produce heat inside reactors when 
uranium atoms split in a process known as fission.
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There are two reactor designs that are most common for nuclear power plants.  They 
include Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs).  PWRs keep 
the water inside the reactor under pressure, allowing it to generate high temperatures, but 







preventing it from boiling.  This super-heated water circulates through a loop of tubes inside 
steam generators.  The water inside the steam generators is allowed to turn into steam in order to 
turn the generator turbines.  The super-heated water from the reactor loop never mixes with the 
water from the steam generator.  This closed-circuit system is an advanced safety feature in more 
modern reactor designs.  Figure “C” below is a simple illustration of the main components of a 
PWR. 
Figure C.  Pressure Water Reactor 
 
PWRs differ from BWRs, wherein the water heated by fission within the reactor actually 
boils, turning into the steam that turns the turbine generator to produce electricity.  In both of 
these reactor designs, water is condensed within the system loop so that it can be converted back 
into water and recirculated through the reactor core.
23
  Figure “D” below is an illustration of the 
main components of a BWR. 
 
 





Figure D.  Boiling Water Reactor 
 
 In order to better understand the case studies for this research, there are twelve critical 
nuclear reactor components to be familiar with.  These components are illustrated below in 
Figure “E”: 
· Component “1” shows the reactor’s fuel rods.  Hundreds of these twelve-foot uranium rods 
undergo a fission reaction which releases extreme heat. 
· Component “2” is the reactor itself, a steel pressure vessel containing the fuel rods, water, and 
other reactor components. 
· Component “3” are the control rods.  The neutron-absorbing rods can be raised from or lowered 
between the fuel rods by operators in order to speed up or slow down the fission reaction. 
· Component “4” is the water pump.  This pump keeps water circulating through the loop in 
order to transfer heat away from the reactor core. 
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· Component “5” is the pressurizer.  This vessel contains water, air, and steam.  Operators can 
control the pressure of the coolant water around the reactor by adding or releasing air in the 
pressurizer. 
· Component “6” is the heat exchanger.  This pipe carries hot water from the reactor core to a 
separate reservoir of water. 
· Component “7,” the separate reservoir, is known as the steam generator.  The heat exchanger 
brings the hot water from the reactor to this reservoir, causing the water to boil, producing steam. 
· Component “8” is the steam line, the pipe in which steam travels to the turbine. 
· Component “9” is the turbine which spins as the steam passes through it. 
· Component “10” is the generator.  The turbine spins a rotor that sits in a magnetic field inside 
the generators casing, inducing an electric current. 
· Component “11” is a transformer, a device that transfers electricity from the generator to the 
power grid, “stepping up” or “stepping down” (transforming) the voltage as needed to prevent 
lulls or surges of electricity. 
· Component “12” is the condenser, a pipe that carries a steady supply of cold water (often from 















Figure E.  Nuclear Power Plant Components 
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Nuclear and Radiological Disasters 
What are nuclear and radiological disasters? 
Nuclear and radiological disasters are incidents in which nuclear material and/or 
radioactive substances which produce ionizing radiation are released in a manner that results in 
significant exposure and harm to people, infrastructure, and/or the natural environment.  
Historically, these incidents tend to occur when natural disasters, system failures, or human error 
result in the unintended breach of special nuclear or radioactive material within a nuclear power 
plant.  However, there are also documented incidents of individuals and groups who have sought 
to intentionally expose human populations, infrastructure, and the natural environment to 
ionizing radiation outside of the industrial environments that are traditionally better equipped to 
deal with such exposure. 
In the event of a nuclear or radiological disaster, the IAEA has developed the 
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) to classify the severity and 
implications of incidents and accidents.  According to the IAEA: 
The primary purpose of INES is to facilitate communication and understanding 
between the technical community, the media and the public on the safety 
significance of events. The aim is to keep the public as well as nuclear authorities 















What is the difference between a nuclear disaster and a radiological disaster? 
 The terms “nuclear disaster” and “radiological disaster” are often used interchangeably, 
both in public discourse and among those who work within the nuclear industry.  For the purpose 
of this research, the important distinction to make between “nuclear” and “radiological” is that 
the term “nuclear” is only used for incidents which involve Special Nuclear Material (SNM) 
used or created through the process of fission (e.g. nuclear reactors, nuclear bombs).  This 
distinction is particularly important when discussing attacks involving an Improvised Nuclear 
Device (IND), versus discussing attacks involving a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD).  In 
this case, the distinction is that an IND is a “nuclear disaster,” because the device being used 
includes a nuclear fission chain-reaction to cause harm.  An attack with an RDD is a 





“radiological disaster,” because radioactive material is dispersed without a fission reaction – 
even if there is a conventional explosion involved. 
What potential nuclear and radiological disasters are most likely to threaten human 
populations? 
There are three main nuclear and radiological threats to human populations: incidents, accidents, 
and attacks. 
Incidents include disasters that are the direct result of a non-human action or events 
(although human inaction can often be argued as a contributing factor).  These incidents include 
disasters that result from natural events (earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, etc.), the failure or 
malfunction of properly used and maintained equipment, and system failures that do not involve 
operator error or design flaws.  Such incidents have contributed to the damage of industrial 
nuclear sites, incidents of radioactive exposure, and the temporary and permanent decommission 
of nuclear reactors. 
Accidents typically include disasters that are related to unintentional human error.  
Accidents have resulted from individuals neglecting to take action, a lack of planning and/or 
preparedness, failing to maintain and/or update equipment and technology, the improper training 
of personnel, the improper handling, storage, and disposal of materials, and not following 
procedures.  These human errors have resulted in radiation exposure, poisoning, and death, steam 
explosions, partial and full reactor meltdowns, explosions, and breaches.  
Attacks are disasters in which an individual or group has intentionally used nuclear 
technology or radioactive material to cause harm.  These threats include attacks and/or sabotage 
against industrial nuclear sites, the deployment of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), and 
the detonation of Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs). 
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Attacks against industrial nuclear sites would likely involve attempting to damage and 
breach a site’s nuclear containment structures to cause widespread radioactive exposure.   
There are several types of RDDs that can be deployed against human populations.  The 
RDDs believed to pose the greatest threat to human populations are Radiation Emission Devices 
(REDs) and Radiological Incendiary Device (RIDs).  REDs would include radioactive material 
being hidden in a public, high-traffic environment in order to expose a population to ionizing 
radiation without their knowledge, causing widespread radiation poisoning.  REDs may also 
include devices which emit radioactive material through an aerosol device.  An aerosol device 
would be deployed with the same objectives as RIDs, except that an aerosol device would emit 
radioactive material through the release of contaminated pressurized gases from a canister, rather 
than by projecting them into the air from a conventional explosive.  While aerosols represent a 
more sophisticated type of dispersal device, REDs can be as simple as a container of radiological 
material being dumped into a water supply.  While such devices may be crude in terms of the 
technology involved, the problems they can cause are no less serious.  IREs are simple, 
conventional bombs surrounded by radioactive material and detonated in or around public, high-
traffic environments (public events, tourist attractions) or high-valued targets (seats of 
government, commercial and financial districts).  RIDs are commonly referred to as “dirty 
bombs.”  The purpose of RIDs includes causing some amount of death, but the main objective is 
to cause panic, disrupt daily life, cause significant economic harm, and contaminate 
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What are the consequences of nuclear and radiological disasters? 
In order to understand the relative scope and consequences of RDDs, reactor meltdowns, 
and INDs, I have included plausible, hypothetical scenarios for such incidents effecting New 
York City.  I have selected New York City for these scenarios because it is considered to be the 
city most likely to face a large-scale, coordinated terrorist attack.
29
  The first scenario will 
demonstrate the effects of an RDD, specifically an RID or “dirty bomb” detonated in Midtown 
Manhattan.  The second scenario will show the effects of a reactor meltdown and/or breach at the 
Indian Point nuclear power facility in Upstate New York.  The third scenario will illustrate the 
effects of an IND at the same Midtown Manhattan target point as the RID scenario.  I have 
selected to review these scenarios in (what I consider to be) their descending order of probability.  
An explanation of these probabilities will be provided later in this research.  Coincidentally, they 
are also listed in ascending order of harm. 
Scenario 1: “Dirty Bomb”  
The first scenario, illustrated in Figure “F,” shows the areas that would be affected by a 2 
ton “dirty bomb” detonated at West 45
th




 Avenue in Midtown 
Manhattan.  The data for this model projects that damage would be concentrated in the areas 
from West 40
th
 Street to West 50
th




 Avenue.  Damage in these areas 
would likely include broken glass from shattered windows and the settling of whatever 
radioactive material was dispersed by the blast.  Most fatalities and serious structural damage, 
including partial or full building collapses, would be primarily confined to the localized blast 
area on West 45
th




 Avenue.   
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Due to a lack of data, as well as to variations in pedestrian traffic, the generator was not 
able to provide an estimate for the number of casualties for this scenario.  However, experts 
believe that nearly all casualties would be caused by the conventional effects of the explosion, 
not by ionizing radiation.  Warren Stern said the following regarding such RID attacks: 
Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing 
radiation from a typical RDD.
31
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Stern explains how the major effects of “dirty bombs” are caused by panic and from the 
economic costs associated with decontamination and rebuilding.  The short and long-term health 
effects of radioactive exposure associated with this scenario would be difficult to quantify, or to 
even find evidence for – but the economic, political, social, and cultural impacts would be 
staggering.  It is clear that the greatest consequences of a “dirty bomb” are not physical, they are 
psychological.  The general public’s lack of understanding of radioactive materials, the 
difference between nuclear and radiological explosives, and general misconceptions about 
radiation would likely fuel wider panic.  Paranoia over contamination would likely collapse real 
estate values, close businesses, and cause people to abandon their property and homes – even in 
neighborhoods outside of the affected areas.  The areas affected by the blast would be closed off, 
and a once bustling neighborhoods would become ghost towns.  The loss of employment would 
be widespread.  Financial markets would suffer due to uncertainty.  Pressure on government 
resources would be significant.  Families, friends, and individual lives would be completely 
uprooted. 
Scenario 2: Radiation from Indian Point 
Scenario 2 involves a simulation conducted by the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
simulating a 48 hour severe nuclear accident at Indian Point nuclear power plant in Buchanan, 
New York from March 11
th
 to March 12
th
, 2011.  Figure “G” is a map which shows varying 
levels of radioactive plumes that would have been spread based on weather patterns for the dates 
selected.  The pattern of these plumes could vary significantly based on the weather patterns for 
any other set of dates.  For the purposes of this scenario, it is assumed that the radiological event 
is contained within the 48 hour period. 
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The nuclear power plant at Indian Point in Buchanan, New York has a 50-mile potential 
contamination zone that includes New York City, as well as several other major cities across the 
tristate area (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut).  The plant has two operating nuclear 
reactors.  These reactors are modern Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs), and were initially 
licensed 38 years ago.   These reactors are currently operating at 106.25% of their original output 
design.  Based on records from the 2010 U.S. Census, more than 317,000 people live within the 
10-mile evacuation zone, which includes 71 public schools and 7 hospitals.  More than 
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17,640,000 people reside within the 50-mile potential contamination zone, which includes more 
than 3,900 public schools and 470 hospitals. 
The consequences of Scenario 2 would be moderate to severe.  In this scenario, hundreds 
of square miles of natural, urban, and suburban environments would be (at the very least) 
temporarily exposed to or contaminated by ionizing radiation.  Hundreds of thousands of people 
would be affected by the event.  Human populations would be exposed to the following levels of 
ionizing radiation (in ascending order): 
· 75 Rads, a level high enough to cause radiation sickness; 
· 25 Rads, the maximum recommended dose for emergency responders; 
· 5 Rads, the dose at which evacuation is recommended; and 
· 1 Rad, the level of radiation at which temporary sheltering is recommended. 
These levels of radiation and the areas they affect are illustrated by their respective radiation 
plumes shown in Figure “G.”  Exposure to these plumes would have both short-term and long 
term health consequences similar to, but less-severe than those experienced in areas affected by 
the nuclear accident in Chernobyl.  Additionally, these areas would experience similar 
environmental, economic, political, social, and cultural consequences outlined by the RID attack 
in Scenario 1. 
 Scenario 3 examines the consequences of a 1 kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device at the 
same target point in Manhattan as Scenario 1.  Of the three hypothetical scenarios outlined in this 
research, Scenario 3 would cause the greatest level of harm.  Figure “H” illustrates the effect of 
the nuclear device through color-coded concentric rings which indicate the characteristics and 
severity of damage.  In this scenario, fatalities would be expected to pass 67,000.  The number of 
persons injured would approach 130,000. 
39 
 
Figure H.  The Consequences of a 1 Kiloton Nuclear Device 
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The fireball produced by this IND (represented by the orange center in figure “H”) would be 
approximately 80 meters in diameter and 0.02 km² in area, and would vaporize everything in its 
vicinity.  The 20 psi air blast radius (represented by the red ring in Figure H) would be 
approximately 220 meters wide and 0.15 km² in area.  Within this area, all heavily built concrete 
buildings would be severely damaged or demolished, and fatalities would remain at nearly 
100%.  The 5 psi air blast radius (represented by the violet ring in Figure H) would be 
approximately 460 meters wide and 0.66 km² in area.  Within this area, most residential 
buildings would completely collapse, injuries would be nearly universal, and fatalities would be 
widespread.  The thermal radiation radius (represented by the orange ring in Figure H) would be 
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approximately 0.5 km wide and 0.79 km² in area.  Survivors in this area have a 100% probability 
for third degree burns at this yield.  These burns would extend throughout the layers of skin.   
The severity of these burns would likely result in nerve damage, severe scarring, disablement, 
and possible amputations for those who survived.  The 500 rem radiation radius (represented by 
the green outer ring in Figure H) would be approximately 0.84 km wide and 2.2 km² in area. This 
dose of 500 REM radiation would result in a 50-90% mortality rate from acute effects alone for 
individuals who did not receive immediate medical attention.  Victims exposed to this level of 
radiation could die within several hours, linger for several weeks, or be among the 10-50% to 
survive.  In addition to these radii, there are over 415,000 people in the 1 psi blast range for this 
scenario at any given time.  These individuals would likely see and feel the blast, and some could 




















Figure I illustrates the estimated radioactive fallout contours for a 1 kiloton surface burst with 15 
mph winds bearing South/Southeast.  The orange-colored central cone in this figure represents 
the central point of the nuclear reaction in this scenario.  The red fallout contour represents 
radioactive fallout of 180 rads per hour with a maximum downwind cloud distance of 0.7 km and 
a maximum width of 80 meters, covering an area of 60 m².  The red-orange fallout contour 
represents radioactive fallout of 100 rads per hour with a maximum downwind cloud distance of 
7.36 km with a maximum width of 460 meters, covering an area of 21.5 km². 
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The orange fallout contour (Figures I and J) represents radioactive fallout of 10 rads per hour 
with a maximum downwind cloud distance of 27.5 km and a maximum cloud width of 2.27 km, 
covering an area of 119 km². The yellow fallout contour (Figures I and J) represents radioactive 
fallout of 1 rads per hour with a maximum downwind cloud distance of 47.7 km and a maximum 
cloud width of 4.08 km, covering an area of 273 km².  Because this model was built assuming 
that the device was detonated at ground level, the amount of radioactive fallout is significantly 
increased.  This is important to consider when evaluating the potential short and long-term health 
effects of this disaster scenario, given the rem and rad levels involved and their corresponding 
side effects. 
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Which states are prepared to deal with such disasters, and do these states correspond to the 
populations most at risk? 
Through IAEA protocols, every Member State with nuclear materials or technology within its 
borders is required to adhere to certain guidelines for nuclear safety, safeguards, and security.  
Nuclear safety refers to the industry’s “best practices” in terms of preparing for incidents and 
avoiding accidents.  Nuclear safeguards refer to standards that require states to comply with 
guidelines for monitoring, regulating, and accounting for nuclear technology and material within 
their borders.  Safeguards are primarily designed to prevent states from diverting special nuclear 








Key: Yellow = Under Construction. Blue = Planned. Orange = Not Operating. Green = 
Operating. Red = Shut Down. 
A state’s nuclear security practices refer to its ability to keep nuclear sites safe from theft, 
sabotage, and/or attack – presumably from non-state actors.  What this essentially means is that 
any state that has an industrial nuclear facility within its border is required to comply with 
universal standards to prevent and prepare for nuclear and radiological disasters.  Figure J shows 
the locations of all nuclear power plants that are planned, under construction, operating, not 
operating, or shut down.  In theory, all of the population in proximity to these reactor locations 
are at risk of being exposed to nuclear and radiological disasters – but their states are also, in 
theory, required to have certain safety and response systems in place to prevent such disasters.  





The cause for concern is that nearly all of the IAEA’s programs, protocols, objectives, resources, 
and expertise that guide the development of these systems are geared towards safety, safeguards, 
and security – not towards developing and executing effective responses for long-term 
decontamination.  Additionally, all of the response and decontamination procedures that states 
have in place are typically related to nuclear industrial sites, not to areas potentially affected 
around industrial sites.  The significance of this final point will be discussed later in this 
research. 
In terms of populations most at risk to nuclear and radiological attacks in the form of 
RDDs or INDs, there is significant room for speculation.  However, according to a report by 
catastrophe modeling specialist Risk Management Solutions Inc. entitled "Quantifying U.S. 
Terrorism Risk," the Newark-based company claims that the risk of a major terror attack in the 
United States is very high.  The company sites 30 major attack plots that have led to convictions 
since the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001.  The top 5 cities named as most likely to 
be targeted by terrorist attacks were 1. New York, 2. Chicago, 3. Los Angeles, 4. San Francisco, 
and 5. Washington, D.C.
38
  While it is true that the U.S. remains a high-visibility target for 
terrorists, it is important to remember that terrorist attacks occur all over the world.  Most 
attempted uses of RDDs have been commissioned by Chechen rebels seeking to attack the 
Russian Federation and its allies in Eastern Europe.  Other successful terrorist attacks have been 
carried out from London to Mumbai to Tokyo.  The fact is that all major metropolitan cities with 
high population densities, strategic political and financial centers, and popular tourist attractions 
are equally likely targets.  Unfortunately, it is also a fact that states all over the world are 
woefully unprepared to respond to nuclear and radiological disasters that target urban, suburban, 
                                                          
38





residential, and commercial areas.  This lack of preparedness is directly tied to the way in which 
the handling of nuclear material has been developed over time.  Because the focus of nuclear 
responses has been on reacting to industrial nuclear accidents, the framework for non-industrial 
responses has been slow to develop. 
How have states dealt with nuclear and radiological disasters in the past? 
There have been more than 100 nuclear and radiological incidents and accidents across 
the globe since the 1950s.  Some of the most notable events (because they involve the escape of 
ionizing radiation) include the following:
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· On September 29, 1957, in Kyshtym, Russia (USSR), an INES Level 6 Nuclear disaster 
occurred at the Mayak nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.  There are not sufficient records 
documenting the consequences of this incident.  It is believed that no response was undertaken. 
· On October 10, 1957, in Sellafield, Cumberland, United Kingdom, a fire at the British atomic 
bomb project destroyed the reactor core.  The accident resulted in an INES Level 5 accident and 
the release of an estimated 20,000 curies of radioactive material into the surrounding 
environment.  No environmental decontamination process was undertaken. 
· On January 21, 1969, at the Lucens Reactor in Vaud, Switzerland, an INES Level 4 incident 
occurred when the reactor core suffered a loss in coolant, causing a partial core meltdown and 
massive radioactive contamination of the cavern.   In response, the cavern was sealed off. 
· On January 5, 1976, at Jaslovske Reactor in Bohunice, Czechoslovakia, an INES Level 4 
incident occurred when a malfunction during fuel replacement caused a fuel rod to be ejected 
from the reactor into the reactor house, killing 2 workers.  The plant area was scrubbed and 
operations resumed. 
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· On February 22, 1977, at Jaslovske Reactor in Bohunice, Czechoslovakia, an INES Level 4 
incident occurred when severe corrosion of the reactor core resulted in the release of 
radioactivity into the plant’s operations area, forcing the plant to be completely decommissioned. 
· On March 28, 1979, an INES Level 5 incident occurred at the plant on Three Mile Island, 
Pennsylvania, USA when the loss of coolant and partial core meltdown caused by operator errors 
led to the release of small amounts of radioactive gases.  The plant was cleaned to reduce 
contamination and allow one reactor to continue operating, but the reactor in question was 
decommissioned. 
· On April 26, 1986, at the power plant in Chernobyl, Ukrainian (USSR), an INES Level 7 
accident occurred when an ill-advised experiment led to system overheating, steam explosion, 
fire, and reactor meltdown.  Fifty-six people died in the initial accident – possibly thousands 
from long-term effects, more than 300,000 had to be relocated as radioactive material spread 
across Europe. 
· On May 4, 1986, in Hamm-Uentrop, Germany, an experimental reactor releases small amounts 
of fissile material into the surrounding area.  After the incident, the plant was cleaned, but no 
large-scale environmental cleanup was undertaken. 
· In March 1992, at the Sosnovyi Bor nuclear power plant in Leningrad Oblast, Russia, an 
accident caused radioactive gases and iodine to be leaked into the air through a ruptured fuel 
line. 
· On March 11
th
, 2011, in Fukushima, Japan, a tsunami flooded and damaged the 5 reactor plant, 
knocking out power and destroying backup electrical generators for the cooling system. The 
result of the accident was overheating, multiple reactor meltdowns, large-scale evacuations, and 
catastrophic environmental contamination.  Four years later, the response is ongoing. 
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 While the details surrounding these incidents may vary to some degree, one common 
threat that they all share is that their responses (whenever applicable) were limited to the 
decontamination of personnel, equipment, and the nuclear industrials facilities involved.  In 
every incident and accident, there is a consistent pattern of non-response in terms of 
environmental decontamination – a clear sign that there are organizational and technical gaps in 






Case Study of the Chernobyl Reactor Meltdown 
The first nuclear disaster to be classified as a Level 7, “Major Disaster” on the 
International Nuclear Event Scale, Chernobyl is still the deadliest radiological event in history.  
On April 26
th
, 1986, a group of unqualified scientists initiated an experiment on Reactor 4 of the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant near Pripyat, Ukraine (USSR).  The scientists sought to test 
potential backup power sources for the reactor’s cooling system when the reactor is running at 
low power.  Unknown to the scientists conducting the test, when they lowered power to the 
reactor by inserting ion-absorbing control rods between the fuel rods, they reduced the ability of 
the reactor to “burn-off” xenon-135, an ion-absorbing byproduct of iodine-135 in the fission 
process.  The presence of xenon-135 produced the same result as having extra control rods in the 
reactor, causing the power in Reactor 4 to drop below anticipated levels – eventually as low as 
35MW, 5% of the minimum safe power level for testing.  Concerned by the sudden drop in 
power, the scientists began removing the control rods, not realizing that power would not return 
to normal levels until the xenon-135 had been burned-off by ionizing radiation.  In attempting to 
restore power, the scientists overcompensated by removing more fuel rods than regulatory 
guidelines permitted.  In fact, the scientists even disable an automated control safety system so 
that they could circumvent safety procedures and remove control rods manually.  All the while, 
as the xenon-135 was burning-off, the plant headed steadily towards disaster.  Out of 211 control 
rods, only 18 of 28 safety rods remained in place – 10 having been removed manually.  Despite 
not understanding the low-power anomaly, the scientists decided to push forward with their test 
for auxiliary power for the reactor’s cooling system.  The test, which reduced power to the 
cooling system and slowed the flow of coolant to the reactor, naturally caused an increase of 
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temperature and pressure in the system.  At 1:23 a.m., an emergency reactor shutdown 
mechanism known as SCRAM was initiated.  It is believed that this process was initiated by the 
scientists conducting the experiment, although some expert suggest that the response may have 
been automated due to reactor conditions.  In either case, it is believed that the emergency 
reactor shutdown was initiated due to a sudden unanticipated spike in power from the reactor.  
Ironically, this spike was exacerbated by the emergency shutdown procedure.  It turns out that 
the control rods had a terrible design flaw - they were designed with graphite tips.  Graphite is 
non-neutron-absorbing and acts as a moderator in the fission process.  This means that as the 
control rods were inserted into the reactor, they actually increased the fission process with 
graphite before the reactor could benefit from the neutron-absorbing boron which composed the 
rest of the rods.  Within three seconds of the graphite entering the reactor core, the power output 
spiked to 530MW, causing the reactor core to overheat and fuel rods to break.  The broken fuel 
rods, in turn, caused the control rods to become jammed – blocking them from being fully 
inserted to stop the fission process.  This further increased power and heat within the system, 
leading to a significant increase in steam pressure.  The power then surged to 30,000MW, 
followed by a massive steam explosion that blasted the 2000-ton upper plate of the reactor 
through the roof of the reactor building.  Seconds later, a nuclear power transient explosion 
(involving a partial fission reaction) equivalent to 10 tons of TNT rocked the area, spewing 
xenon radioisotopes from the site.  The graphite mixed with fuel elements burst into flames upon 
coming into contact with the open air, causing widespread fires throughout the complex.  
Graphite and fuel from parts of the reactor core still inside the reactor building caught fire, 
turning into corium (a kind of molten liquid ceramic) lava.  Plumes of smoke from fires at the 
site carried radioactive material across Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and other parts of Europe.  
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According to a 2008 UNSCEAR report, 64 deaths can be directly attributed to the Chernobyl 
disaster, mostly from plant workers and emergency responders close to the incident.  The 
Chernobyl Forum estimates that nearly 4,000 deaths (mostly cancer related) in the decades since 
the accident can be attributed to its effects.  The Chernobyl disaster resulted in the permanent, 
mandatory evacuation of approximately 330,000 people, including the total population of the city 
of Pripyat, Ukraine. 
Evaluating the Chernobyl Response 
The initial response to the accident at Chernobyl was what one might expect.  Shortly 
after the explosion, local area firefighters began to arrive and battle the fires around the complex.  
Casualties were evacuated throughout the morning as they were discovered.  By 2:30 a.m., the 
turbine hall and Number 4 Reactor hall roof fires had been suppressed.  Additional firefighters 
arrived from Kiev by 3:30 a.m., and all localized fires were suppressed by 6:30 a.m.   Only the 
fire inside the remnants of Reactor 4’s core continued to burn, finally being extinguished after 
several days.  Communication regarding the radiation risks involved for first responders was 
virtually non-existent, and they represent the accident’s largest group of casualties from radiation 
poisoning.  At this point in the disaster’s timeline, most people were not aware that a nuclear 
accident had occurred. 
Within hours of the explosion, citizens in nearby Pripyat, Ukraine, began to fall ill with 
symptoms of Acute Radiation Syndrome.  Because the Chernobyl plant was administered by 
authorities in Moscow, Ukrainian leaders were not immediately informed of the accident.  A 
delegation of Moscow authorities and experts arrived on the evening of April 26
th
 to assess the 
severity of the accident.  It was at that point that individuals within the government began to 





, the mandatory evacuation order was given for Pripyat and the surrounding areas.  
Those who left their homes were initially told that the evacuation would only be for a three-day 
period, and to only bring their personal documents and essential items.  While it does not appear 
that this was an intentional strategy, it did help to expedite the evacuation process.  It took more 
than 24 hours after the explosion for the government to issue the evacuation order.  Those who 
were evacuated from the contamination zones were given iodine tablets as a preventative 
measure against the development of thyroid cancer.  These individuals had their health closely 
monitored in the years following the accident, as they had an increased risk of developing 
cancer. 
As the fires cooled at the Chernobyl site, the plants other reactors were still functional.  
Because the accident coincided with a power shortage in the region, Soviet authorities wanted to 
keep Chernobyl’s other reactors online.  This meant undertaking a significant industrial 
decontamination operation.  Many of the workers involved in this initial process ended up 
becoming casualties of the disaster.  Eventually it was determined that total decontamination of 
the area would not be possible, and so workers were organized to construct a large concrete 
sarcophagus to entomb the entire Reactor 4 building.  In the weeks, months and eventually years 
following the accident, the government would dispatch more than 500,000 workers to assist with 
containing the disaster.  Eventually, as the site aged, the other reactors at Chernobyl were 
decommissioned.  In more recent years, plans were developed to add an additional structure to 
shelter the concrete sarcophagus over Reactor 4.  This newer, safer containment structure was 
supposed to be completed by 2005, but has yet to be completed as of 2017.
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Case Study of the Fukushima Reactor Meltdown 
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The only other nuclear disaster (besides Chernobyl) to be classified as a Level 7 event on 
the International Nuclear Event Scale is the one that began on March 11
th
, 2011, in Fukushima, 
Japan.  The cascade of events leading to the disaster began when a magnitude 9.0 earthquake 
occurred at 2:46 p.m., approximately 130 kilometers off of the east coast of Japan in the Pacific 
Ocean.  About an hour later, at 3:42 p.m., a tsunami estimated to be 13 meters high hit the east 
coast of Japan, including the Fukushima 1 Power Plant.  Eight minutes later, a second tsunami 
measuring 15 meters in height struck the plant again.
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At the time, only three of the plant’s six reactors were in operation.  These reactors, 
numbers 1, 2, and 3, had survived the initial earthquake without any damage – and while the 
plant contained a 10 meter-high outer seawall to protect against tsunamis, it was no match for a 
natural disaster of this magnitude.  The seawater rushed over the outer wall of the complex, 
smashing into the reactor buildings.  By this point, emergency shutdown procedures had already 
been initiated, and the control rods for all three reactors were already fully inserted, terminating 
the fission process.  However, auxiliary power for the reactors’ cooling systems consisted of 
short-term-use batteries and extended-use diesel generators.  The problem was that the batteries 
and diesel generators were all located below ground-level and had been flooded with seawater.  
Only Reactor 3 had functioning battery power which lasted for about 30 hours.  The lack of 
power also caused the shutdown of the reactors’ instrument control panels.  Furthermore, the 
tsunamis washed away most roads in the area, making it very difficult to deliver outside 
resources to remedy the situation.
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The lack of power to the reactors’ cooling systems was a critical problem because, while 
the control rods were in place, it still would have taken several days to cool down the reactor 
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cores.  As engineers worked to restore power to the reactors’ cooling systems, heat within the 
cores began to build, causing hot zirconium fuel cladding-water reactions.  Zirconium is often 
used as an inner-cladding or barrier material in reactors.  Unfortunately, under certain conditions, 
zirconium reacts unstably with water.   These reactions, caused by the extreme heat, resulted in 
the separation of hydrogen particles inside the reactor cores.  Each reactor produced thousands of 
pounds of highly-pressurized, explosive hydrogen gas.  As pressure continued to build inside the 
cores, this hydrogen gas was released into the reactor pressure vessels through emergency 
venting.  The exposure of these explosive gas concentrations to ambient air resulted in multiple 
explosions in the upper secondary containment building of all three reactors.  Reactor 1 exploded 
on March 12
th
, Reactor 3 on March 14
th
, and Reactor 2 on March 15
th
.  These explosions tore the 
roofs from all three containment buildings, exposing their spent-fuel pools to the open 
environment.  This means that in addition to avoiding being killed by three on-site explosions, 
engineers now had the precarious challenge of trying to contain three reactor meltdowns and 
three exposed spent-fuel pools simultaneously.
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Engineers attempted to cool the reactors by pumping seawater into the cores.  This excess 
of water within the facility contributed to massive leaks of contaminated seawater into the 
Pacific Ocean.  Meanwhile, the breakup of fuel and other reactor elements eventually resulted in 
the creation of radioactive corium lavas which melted through the reactor cores and are now 




While the disaster at Fukushima raises serious concerns, it is fortunate that no casualties 
have been directly attributed to the accident.  Additionally, the areas with the greatest level of 
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radioactive contamination at the Fukushima site only have 10-12% of the level of contamination 
that exists at Chernobyl.  The World Health Organization projects that the radiation released at 
Fukushima will not result in any significant health effects, and may result in no deaths.  This can 
be attributed to the swift response in evacuating nearby populations and gathering experts to 
respond at the industrial site.  It is estimated that the average level of radioactive contamination 
caused by the disaster is equivalent to 0.001% of natural background levels of radiation, or 
roughly the same amount of natural radiation contained in the potassium of one banana.
45
 
Evaluating the Fukushima Response 
 Some evaluations of the initial response by the Japanese government and TEPCO, the 
electric utility company operating the Fukushima plant, are less than flattering.  First, in terms of 
preparedness, TEPCO ignored 2008 tsunami evaluations that indicated the plant needed to 
address the vulnerability of its auxiliary power systems to flooding.
46
  Second, the utility 
company should have had a plan for off-site power generators to be delivered in the event of on-
site power failures.  Third, Japanese nuclear regulators should have ensured that TEPCO take 
these actions.  Fourth, both the electric utility and the government should have had a better 
communications plan in place with regard to coordinating the response and clarifying 
responsibility.  Lastly, the Japanese government should have taken over the response sooner, as 
it was clear early on that TEPCO was mismanaging the onsite response.  Had it done so, it is 
possible that off-site power sources could have been delivered, and the disaster may have been 
lessened or completely averted. 
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In terms of the initial response in managing citizens affected by the disaster, the response 
seemed to go fairly well.  On the first day of the accident, the Japanese government issued 
mandatory evacuation orders for nearly 134,000 people within a 3 km area surrounding the 
Fukushima Power Plant, and made preparations for the evacuation to be extended as far as 30 
km.  Within four days, the evacuation area had been extended to 354,000 people within 20 km of 
the plant.  The government then enforced a 20 km exclusion zone with roadblocks in order to 
prevent citizens from potential radioactive exposure. 
In terms of gathering resources and expertise to respond to the disaster, the Japanese 
government requested and received assistance from the United States military in the forms of 
personnel decontamination equipment and robots to assist with initial exploration of 
contaminated areas.  Experts from the IAEA were brought in to help assess the situation and 
provide advice.  The World Health Organization was brought in to evaluate potential health risks 
for first responders and potentially affected populations in the surrounding areas.  Atmospheric 
measurements and oceanic samples were taken around the globe and streamlined to help monitor 
the global implications of the disaster.  As a result, it appears that this Level 7 accident may 





Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies 
The first concept I have chosen to evaluate when comparing these two case studies is the 
level of International Cooperation related to their respective responses.  In the context of this 
research, the term “International Cooperation” refers to the state’s engagement with other states 
and intergovernmental/international organizations to secure resources and expertise to assist in 
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responding to their disasters.  Additionally, I will take into account the overall political behaviors 
of these states, evaluating whether or not such behaviors are conducive to international 
cooperation, as well as to cooperation in general.  This snapshot of each state’s level of 
international cooperation will serve as the independent variable in this comparative analysis, and 
will be compared to the dependent variable – namely, the Effectiveness of each State’s Response. 
 For the purposes of this research, the term “Effectiveness of Response” refers to the level 
of success that the states from the case studies have had in terms of responding to their respective 
disaster – namely, the following: 
· The swift and effective containment of the nuclear material involved; 
· The effective prevention of rampant contamination; 
· The effective evacuation of affected populations; 
· The effective initiation of a rapid first response that accounts for the wellbeing of first 
responders; 
· The effective decontamination of sites and areas exposed; 
· The effective return of radiation to acceptable background levels; and 
· The effective return of populations to the areas once affected. 
In 1986, Ukraine was under the control of Moscow-based Communist party members in 
the Soviet Union.  The politics of this regime was characterized by secrecy and isolationism.  
Given these characteristics, it is no surprise that the Chernobyl reactor meltdown was initially 
reported by nuclear industry experts in Sweden, rather than government officials in Moscow.  
According to a European Nuclear Society report, the Soviet Union, which was notorious for its 
lack of transparency in the international community, initially denied that a nuclear incident had 
even taken place.  It wasn’t until 9:00 p.m. on April 28
th
, 1986, (nearly three days after the 
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Chernobyl reactor meltdown) that the Soviet Union acknowledged that the accident had 
occurred.  They did so in a discrete, 20 second broadcast on a Soviet state television station.
49
  It 
is believed that the state’s traditional lack of transparency, coupled with its political ideology of 
self-sufficiency, significantly hindered any chances for international cooperation in responding 
to the Chernobyl disaster.  This lack of international cooperation limited the pool of resources 
and experts available to the Soviet Union for managing the consequence of the disaster.  The 
hierarchical political structure prevented local officials from being informed, and a political 
culture of secrecy delayed the internal response.  In fact, it can be argued that secrecy allowed 
for the Chernobyl disaster to happen in the first place.  It turns out that the Soviet government 
was aware of the design flaw in the graphite tipped control rods from an incident that had 
occurred during an experiment at another reactor site
50
 – but the political culture of secrecy 
prevented that information from being shared, even among relevant parties.  This same lack of 
information sharing is likely what caused scientists at the Chernobyl site to be unaware of the 
xenon-135 byproducts inside the reactor.  International cooperation in Chernobyl did not 
improve until Ukraine gained its independence upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, although 
cooperation is still hindered by regional politics today. 
Nearly 30 years after the Chernobyl accident, permanent evacuation and questionably 
maintained containment are the sum total of achievements for managing the disaster.  The slow 
initial response to the disaster led to thousands of people being exposed to high levels of 
radiation, causing some to suffer from acute radiation syndrome and other to develop cancer.  
The event caused immediate and long-term casualties, especially for first responders who were 
uninformed and ill-equipped.  There are still areas in and around Chernobyl with levels of 
                                                          
49





 Medvedev, Z., The Legacy of Chernobyl, W. W. Norton & Company, 1990. ISBN 978-0-393-30814-3. 
59 
 
radiation that would be fatal to humans.  Environmental decontamination was not successful.  
Radiation levels are nowhere near acceptable background levels, and the populations evacuated 
from the area were never able to return.  Unfortunately, the specter of Soviet politics still affects 
Ukraine today.  Moscow is still the region’s major power broker, and attempts to develop 
international cooperation within the region are met with hostility, subversion, and sabotage by 
former-Soviet actors.  These political realities continue to undermine Ukraine’s ability to 
mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. 
Japan’s level of international cooperation in terms of their response to the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster is in stark contrast to the response in Chernobyl.  When the disaster struck, the 
Japanese government called on assistance from the United States, United Nations, International 
Atomic Energy Agency, World Health Organization, and a multitude of other states and 
International Nongovernmental Organizations.  Japan’s political structure allowed for 
transparency with regard to the incident and the associated response.  However, it is noteworthy 
that there seemed to be an inherent conflict of interest in that Japan’s nuclear regulatory authority 
was responsible for both regulating and promoting the nuclear energy sector.  While this may 
have aided in some of the neglect that contributed to the disaster, there is no evidence to suggest 
that this political dynamic interfered with the state’s response.  Because Japan’s safety, 
safeguards, and security coincided with the parameters set by the IAEA, the state’s capacity to 
respond to the industrial components of the disaster clearly exceeded that of Ukraine under the 
USSR. 
In terms of the effectiveness of Japan’s response to the Fukushima disaster, the state was 
able to quickly contain a significant amount of nuclear material, effectively reducing the extent 
to which the plant, surrounding area, and globe were exposed to radiological material.  
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Furthermore, a speedy and informed initial response helped to neutralize the fission process, 
avoiding a nuclear explosion.  The Japanese government speedily enforced evacuations and 
secured contaminated areas, effectively reducing the general public’s exposure to radiation.  First 
responders were well train and well equipped to deal with the response, and there were no 
casualties.  The decontamination of the site and surrounding area are ongoing, but the level of 
contamination is 10-12% of the levels at Chernobyl.  This was accomplished despite the fact that 
Fukushima had three reactor meltdowns and three exposed spent-fuel storage pools, compared to 
Chernobyl’s one reactor meltdown.   The overall increase in radiation for Fukushima is 0.001% 
higher than regular background radiation.  Those who have been evacuated from Fukushima’s 20 
km exclusion zone have not been able to return to their homes.  It appears that few technological 
advancements have been made in terms of decontaminating non-industrial environments, even in 
the years since Chernobyl. 
In this comparative analysis it is clear that there is a relationship between a state’s level 
of international cooperation and its ability to effectively respond to nuclear and radiological 
disasters.  While the case studies of Chernobyl and Fukushima occurred decades apart, the 
objectives and responsibilities for their respective responses were essentially the same.  Both 
disasters required first responders, evacuations, containments, and some amount industrial 
decontamination.  The technology involved for both incidents was virtually the same, but the 
way in which information was shared and resources were coordinated was entirely different. 
It may seem logical that collective international resources and expertise is better equipped 
to solve problems, but there are some who universally subscribe to realist theories – notions that 
matters of security and emergency should be monopolized by the state.  The politics and 
strategies of the Soviet Union with regard to its response in Chernobyl epitomize realist theory.  
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The USSR was a suspicious and paranoid state, always seeking to safeguard information, and 
always assuming ulterior motives.  The realist’s political culture proved to be counterintuitive in 
terms of the state’s ability to effectively deal with the Chernobyl disaster. 
Japan’s response to the Fukushima is more evocative of Liberal theory in international 
relations, specifically regarding the effect that international organizations have on international 
and domestic politics and policies.  This theory looks at the role of international organizations as 
forums for states to pursue their interests, as well as the role of international organizations as 
actors themselves.  When one considers Japan’s call for assistance to organizations such as the 
IAEA and WHO, it is clear to see that they did so for their own interests.  However, in assisting 
with Japan’s response to the Fukushima disaster, both the IAEA and WHO conducted their own 
evaluations of the event, disseminating their findings to the global community.  Furthermore, 
many of the nuclear industrial safety mechanisms that Japan had in place at the Fukushima plant 
were designed and communicated through the IAEA as a forum.  The disparity between the level 
of preparedness for responses to industrial nuclear sites versus the lack of preparedness for non-
industrial decontamination can be attributed to the fact that international frameworks have helped 
to develop the former, while state strategies have neglected the latter – a clear example of Liberal 




The International Nature of Nuclear and Radiological Disasters 
Are nuclear and radiological disasters international in nature? 
There are few nuclear events that have been as well documented and evaluated as the 
subject of my first case study, the 1986 reactor meltdown in Chernobyl, Ukraine – the accident 
that was in some respects the result of Ukraine being part of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR).   
In its Spring-2006 report entitled “Chernobyl: The Accident, Scenario, and Global 
Impact,” the European Nuclear Society highlights that the consequences of nuclear and 
radiological disasters such as Chernobyl are international in nature.  This report, the society’s 
12
th
 issue, includes an update of the global impact of the Chernobyl reactor meltdown.  The 
report notes that the Chernobyl reactor accident significantly contaminated over 200,000 square 
kilometers of area between Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and other parts of Europe.
51
  In fact, the 
first reports of the reactor meltdown were not provided by Soviet government officials, but by 
nuclear industry officials who were able to detect Chernobyl’s elevated levels of radiation from 
detection devices in Sweden.  To date, this disaster has rendered many of the contaminated areas 
uninhabitable for human populations and certain types of wildlife. 
In an analysis of the subject of my more contemporary case study entitled “Fukushima: A 
Global Threat That Requires a Global Response,” author Kevin Zeese illustrates the international 
consequences of the 2011 Fukushima reactor meltdown.  In his analysis for TruthOut, Zeese 
explains how the reactor meltdown in Fukushima has led to unprecedented levels of radioactive 
contamination throughout the world’s oceans.  His findings show that more than 80,000 gallons 
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of contaminated radioactive water are estimated to be leaking into the Pacific Ocean from the 
Fukushima power plant every day.  The report also explains that all of the tuna fish caught off of 
the coast of California are testing positive for elevated levels of radioactivity, and that the first 
waves of contaminated ocean water reached the shores of the west coast of the United States in 
early 2014.  While this is alarming to a degree, it is important to remember that the level of 
radiation in each of these tunas is roughly equivalent to one-twentieth of the radiation of the 
potassium contained in one banana.  Although the response to Fukushima was much better than 
the one in Chernobyl, Zeese argues that Fukushima is an ongoing, multi-faceted international 
nuclear crisis without a resolution in site.
52
   A scientist researching the global impacts of 
Fukushima was quoted in Zeese’s report, saying “The problems at Fukushima are unprecedented 
in human experience, and involve a high risk of radiation events – larger than any that the global 
community has ever experienced. It is going to take the best engineering minds in the world to 
solve these problems and to diminish their global impact.”
53
  It is fortunate that the Fukushima 
accident involved a greater, albeit imperfect, level of international cooperation, given the 
severity of the challenges involved. 
The important point to take from these articles is that they illustrate how nuclear and 
radiological incidents have international implications, and that when special nuclear material is 
released into the environment, international borders are of no consequence in terms of 
containment.  What is absolutely clear is that these international incidents are better handled 
when international resources and expertise are available. 
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What, if any, international response mechanisms exist to mitigate the effects of nuclear and 
radiological disasters? 
The Need for International Coordination in Consequence Mitigation 
My research has shown a relationship between international cooperation and the 
effectiveness of responses to nuclear and radiological disaster.  However, my research also 
indicates that much of the response mechanisms designed or executed by international 
organizations such as the IAEA are tailored to the needs of nuclear industrial sites, and not non-
industrial areas.  Furthermore, there is clear evidence that there is a lack of international 
coordination and development for technologies capable of mitigating the consequences of 
nuclear and radiological disaster.  In this context, the “mitigating” refers to the ability of 
responders to completely decontaminate industrial, commercial, residential, and natural 
environments of radioactive material – allowing these areas to be returned to use and/or 
habitation.  Thus far, domestic and international response mechanisms have failed in this regard. 
In its publication entitled “Planning for Off-Site Response to Radiation Accidents in 
Nuclear Facilities,” this is the sum total of IAEA recommendations for decontamination: 
Provisional and adequate facilities should be selected and planned for personnel 
decontamination on the basis of characteristics of the site and its environment. 
When persons are advised to seek shelter in buildings located in a contaminated 
area they should also be advised to remove their outer clothing before entering the 
shelter if possible and wash or shower if facilities are available. Used clothes 
should be stored separately in order to prevent possible spread of contamination. 
In the case of evacuation decontamination will be most effective if it can be done 
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at the checkpoint where persons leaving the contaminated area are controlled. 
Means for decontamination should be available at the checkpoint such as: 
1. Radiation survey instruments; 
2. Clean water and facilities for showering or washing hands, faces, necks, etc; 
3. Stocks of clean clothes and foot wear; 
4. Additional cleaning facilities for decontamination of personal belongings and 
possibly vehicles. 
When persons need prompt medical care, decontamination should not preclude 
the necessary medical measures. However, it should be possible to remove 
contaminated clothing immediately and do some washing and cleaning during the 
medical treatment. Checkpoints for controlling the spread of contamination by 
evacuees may be at selected fixed locations or established by mobile stations. 
Mobile stations are preferable since the affected area cannot be known before the 
accident and the decontamination of evacuees and vehicles should be carried out 
as close to the contaminated area as possible to minimize the spread of 
contamination from the contaminated area.
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It is important to note that this document only provides recommendations for the 
initial responses for decontamination individuals at industrial sites – making no mention 
of decontaminating environments of any kind.  Given the consequences outlined by 
simulations contained in this research, the need to develop such capacities is urgent.  
These capacities might be developed by expanding the roles of some of the following 
international response mechanisms: 
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· IAEA Incident and Emergency System 
· IAEA Assistance in Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents 






Are nuclear and radiological disasters better addressed at the international level? 
The Need for International Coordination for Inevitable Disasters 
Dealing with the cleanup of nuclear and radiological incidents requires high levels of 
financial, intellectual, and technical resources that are too costly for most states to bear on their 
own.  Many of the technological concepts that have been theorized or developed for such 
cleanups have never actually been put into production.  In terms of responding to potential 
nuclear or radiological attacks, any state can fall victim, but few states have the resources or 
procedures in place to deal with clean-up and decontamination in the aftermath.  Both the United 
States and Russia have successfully prevented “dirty-bomb” attacks within their borders by 
affiliates of Al-Qaida and Chechen rebels, respectively.  However, both countries have also 
confirmed that there are powerful radioactive materials within their borders that have been stolen 
or are missing. 
In 1995, Russian special security forces received a tip that Chechen rebels had planted a 
“special” bomb in Moscow's Ismailovsky Park, not far from the Kremlin.  Security teams 
converged on the area, combing through the park to find the bomb.  What was discovered was a 
crude explosive device attached to a container of highly radioactive cesium.
55
   It is disturbing 
that these rebels were able to acquire these materials.  What is more disturbing is that in the 
event they had been able to detonate this device, there would have been no real industry 
standards and best practices to provide guidance, expertise, or technology to manage the large-
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scale environmental decontamination effort.  This is where the international community has the 
greatest opportunity to organize and develop solutions to nuclear and radiological disasters.
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While the U.S. and Russia are exploring procedures and taking precautions to deal with 
future attacks, potential incidents within the borders of less-developed states could escalate and 
impact surrounding states if left unmanaged.  Only the collective resources of the international 
community can create the focal point and organizational infrastructure necessary to research and 
develop effective methods and technologies for dealing with nuclear and radiological 
consequence management. 
By preparing for nuclear and radiological consequence management on the international 
level, the international community can make the highest and best use of the limited pool of 
expertise related to these fields.  States can avoid redundancy in the research and development of 
technologies that all states would need for a prepared response, but would be too costly to 
develop alone.  Now that research has shown a relationship between international cooperation 
and the effectiveness of a state’s responses to nuclear and radiological disasters, there is an 
obligation to promote such frameworks to further develop the capacity for effective responses.  
The international organization with the framework best suited to deal with these issues is, 
without question, the IAEA. 
What framework might be used to establish or build upon international responses to nuclear 
and radiological disasters? 
The New IAEA 
International responses to nuclear and radiological disasters should be managed under a 
new arm of the International Atomic Energy Agency dedicated to consequence management.  
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The IAEA has the technical expertise and organizational framework essential to meet these 
objectives.  This new arm of the IAEA would borrow from, and then further develop existing 
decontamination and cleanup protocols currently being developed for nuclear industrial sites.   
The organization would also develop international guidelines for decontamination procedures 
and determine what levels of radiation are suitable before remediation can begin.  This 
organization would be responsible for the critical task of organizing and developing the universal 
methods and technologies used to resolve nuclear and radiological contamination crisis.  In a 
report highlighting the need for such universal methods and technologies, Jamie Yassif of the 
FAS Public Interest Report said: 
Cleanup after an RDD attack would likely involve removing radioactive 
waste particles from the cracks and crevices of city buildings and streets, a 
challenging task that U.S. officials would have to approach with neither well-
developed technologies nor direct experience. 
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If even the United States is ill-equipped and ill-prepared to respond to a nuclear or 
radiological incident, then clearly this is an issue with a scope and challenge that needs to be 
addressed at the international level.  Given the imminent threat posed by terrorist organizations 
who have already plotted to use RDDs, these procedures should be made an urgent priority for 
the international community.  A poorly managed response to a radiological attack would erode 
public faith and prove disastrous to global markets.  It is in the interest of the international 
community to take decisive action in this matter as soon as possible. 
What would an international response to a nuclear or radiological disaster entail? 
Regional Deployment Centers 
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In an addition to the component of ensuring that a response to nuclear and radiological 
events is developed at the international level, is the more technical, operational aspect of 
developing regional deployment centers that are poised to initiate a response.  Regional 
deployment centers would act as staging points for responses to nuclear and radiological 
disasters.  Each deployment center would be equipped with the components and tools most likely 
to be required for potential disasters within their particular service areas.  For example, a region 
with a large number of nuclear reactors would do more to prepare for a reactor-based incident 
(i.e. commercial reactor meltdown, sabotage, or act of terrorism), while a region with large 
metropolitan areas would do more to prepare for a radiological incident (i.e. dirty bomb).  These 
deployment centers would need to carry all of the technology developed under the direction of 
the IAEA’s new response arm, and exercises would need to be conducted to maintain readiness.  
Procedures would need to be developed to ensure that first-responders take appropriate 
precautions when responding to an incident.  Methods need to be developed for containing 
contaminated areas, and quarantining populations in order to ensure that they have been 
decontaminated before being released.  The technologies and procedures need to be developed 
for scrubbing radiation from buildings and streets in order to reduce radioactivity and allow for 
remediation of the affected areas in a timely manner.  By developing regional deployment 
centers, the international community can ensure that responses to nuclear and radiological 
disasters are timely, well-executed, and tailored to the specific needs of the area being served. 
Public Awareness 
One of the most important components of developing an international response to nuclear 
and radiological disasters is formulating a public information campaign to avoid overreaction in 
the event of such accidents or attacks.  This is because public hysteria can be even more volatile 
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than radiological components.  The threat posed by societal instability in the wake of a disaster 
or attack is very real.  Managing this threat is essential in mitigating the potential economic and 
psychological effects that would likely accompany a radiological attack.  In a report discussing 
the potential ramifications of a radiological attack, researcher Elizabeth Eraker says: 
The Economic disruption resulting from and RDD attack would likely be 
compounded by widespread panic, largely stemming from public fears of 
radiation.  Fueled by historical associations with Hiroshima and Chernobyl and 
the disturbing nature of a hazard that cannot be perceived with the physical 
senses, the public fear of radiation exposure is an opportune target for terrorists.  
The likelihood that social disruption would be the most dangerous consequence of 
a dirty bomb attack implies that the severity of the impact, and thus effectiveness 
of the attack, may very well depend on the preparedness of first-responders and 




 Preparedness seems to be the international community’s best hope for dealing with such 
an attack, not simply for the sake of dealing with the physical consequences of the attack, but 
also for the sake of demonstrating competence to the public.  A well-executed response will 
reinforce public confidence that the situation is under control, and will help reduce economic 
damage in the form of market crashes in real estate and stocks.  Furthermore, the more the public 
understands the nature of a radiological attack, and that such attacks don’t pose the same 
physical threat as an atomic bomb or a reactor meltdown, the less the public is likely to be 
manipulated by fear.  By initiating an effective public information campaign, the international 
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community can “immunize” the general public against the psychological effects of a radiological 
attack.  For this reason, such a public information campaign is essential to an international 
response to nuclear and radiological disasters. 
Conclusion – Final Thoughts 
I conclude that the resources and protocols for responding to nuclear and radiological 
disasters should be organized at the international level. This is due primarily to the fact that 
nuclear and radiological incidents have international implications.  I conclude that there is a 
relationship between international cooperation and the effectiveness of responses to nuclear and 
radiological disaster.  My research has shown that there is a critical need for the development of 
strategies and technologies that can mitigate the consequences of the nuclear and radiological 
incidents the global populations will face.  I assert that the development of decontamination 
procedures and technologies is paramount, and that the collective minds and resources of the 
international community are best equipped to achieve these goals. 
 Despite the safeguards, security procedures, and non-proliferation strategies designed to 
reduce the risk of nuclear and radiological accidents and attacks throughout the world, there are 
still clear indications that states will require an effective consequence management strategy.  
Effectively managing nuclear and radiological disasters is in the interest of the international 
community, and developing such capabilities is not something that most states can do on their 
own.  It is clear that an international response should be developed by the IAEA to manage 
potential nuclear and radiological disasters.  Resources should be gathered at regional 
deployment centers to expedite the execution of consequence management responsibilities.  The 
public should be educated and informed about the realities of radiological and nuclear disasters 
so that they can be immunized against the fear of the unknown.  By taking these steps the 
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international community will exercise due diligence in protecting citizens around the world from 
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